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NOTES
TO PRECLUDE OR NOT TO PRECLUDE?:
SECTION 1983 CLAIMS SURVIVING TITLE IX’S
ONSLAUGHT
I. INTRODUCTION
“I was not the one who did wrong, but I was treated as if I was,” cried a
thirteen-year-old female victim of sexual abuse to her school board.1 Eve
Bruneau, a twelve-year-old A-student, learned to dread attending school. Her
male classmates’ relentless sexual harassment, and the school’s tolerance for
such behavior, shackled Eve’s ability to succeed as a student. Her male
classmates routinely snapped her bra straps, tugged at her clothing, poked
and pinched her body, and called her “whore,” “bitch,” and “lesbian.”2 Once,
when Eve demanded an apology and her male harasser refused, Eve’s
teacher told her, “You’ll be called names all your life— you’re just going to
have to handle it.”3 School authorities refused to transfer Eve to another
sixth-grade class despite her parents’ repeated pleas to help their young,
increasingly depressed, and withdrawn daughter. Eve’s teacher told her
parents that “there was no problem— that these were just sixth-grade boys,
and Eve was so good looking, the boys would be all over her in a few
years.”4
Eve Bruneau’s narrative tells not an unusual, isolated incident, but rather
a typical occurrence in an American girl’s education.5 Sexual harassment,
abuse, and other forms of sex discrimination pervade every grade level of the
U.S. school system with immeasurable adverse consequences for our
children and society.6 Incidents of sexual harassment begin as early as
 1. Niraj Warikoo, A Crusade Targets Sex Abuse in Schools, NEWSDAY, Sept. 23, 1997, at A31.
2. David Behrens, An Unwanted Lesson in the Law, NEWSDAY, Nov. 18, 1996, at A05.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Of course, the type of sexually harassing and abusive conduct may vary with age, but in most
cases school authorities tolerate and condone sexually harassing behavior harmful to women. See infra
notes 6-8. The scope of this Note is not limited to women suffering from sex discrimination in school
settings. The procedural problems addressed in this Note apply to both male and female victims of sex
discrimination. However, because women constitute the vast majority of victims targeted by sex
discriminators, my assessment of sexual discrimination in educational settings is disproportionately
based upon women’s experiences. See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
6. See Dawn A. Ellison, Comment, Sexual Harassment in Education: A Review of Standards for
Institutional Liability Under Title IX, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2049, 2051-52 (1997) (noting several
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kindergarten7 and increase in frequency throughout elementary school.8 Most
notably, peers are responsible for a majority of the harassment at all levels of
education.9 This trend increases in high school with aggressive sexually
harassing conduct occurring daily.10 At the university level, women report
startling numbers of unwelcome sexual attention.11
In each of these school settings, student victims of sexual harassment and
other forms of sex discrimination12 can find relief in the Constitution and
commentators’ findings that sexual harassment is “disturbingly prevalent” in American schools and
may be detrimental to a child’s physical well-being, emotional health, or vocational and academic
development); see also Alexandra A. Bodnar, Arming Students for Battle: Amending Title IX to
Combat the Sexual Harassment of Students By Students in Primary and Secondary School, 5 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 549, 559 (1996); Kirsten M. Eriksson, Note, What Our Children are
Really Learning in School: Using Title IX to Combat Peer Sexual Harassment, 83 GEO. L.J. 1799,
1800 & n.12, 1801 & n.17 (1995) (describing statistical findings of two studies). One study reported
“89% of girls surveyed, ages nine to nineteen, have received suggestive gestures, looks, comments, or
jokes; 83% have been touched, pinched, or grabbed; and 39% reported that this harassment happened
on a daily basis.” Id. at 1800 n.12. Another study found that the effects of sexual harassment on a
young female can result in headaches, stomachaches, depression, suicidal thoughts, cutting classes,
nonparticipation in classroom discussion, lack of confidence and self-knowledge, and unhealthy
relationships. Id. at 1801 & n.17.
After being repeatedly subjected to both lewd comments about her body organs and physical
threats from boys on her school bus, Wcheltzie Hentz was the youngest person to win a claim of
sexual harassment against the U.S. Department of Education. Bodnar, supra, at 554 (citing Karen
Schneider, Sexual Harassment-No Kidding, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 1993, at C8). After enduring the
harassment, she rhetorically asked her mother, “That must be the way boys talk to girls, huh, Mom?”
Id. at 559.
7. See Ruth Shalit, Romper Room: Sexual Harassment— By Tots, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 29,
1993, at 13 (reporting that a five-year-old boy in kindergarten took a female classmate into an adjacent
classroom, pulled down both of their pants, and simulated sexual intercourse).
8. AMERICAN ASSOC. OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW
SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 7 (1993). This survey reported finding
that approximately four out of five students (81%) in grades eight through eleven report have been the
target of some incidence of sexual harassment in school. Id. Moreover, of this 81%, about one in four
(31% of girls and 18% of boys) reported being targeted “often.” Id. For a collection of statistics from
this 1993 survey describing the types and degree of sexual harassment experienced by students, see
Bodnar, supra note 6, at 556-58.
9. See Bodnar, supra note 6, at 557.
10. Monica L. Sherer, Comment, No Longer Just Child’s Play: School Liability Under Title IX
for Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2128-29 (1993); see also, Bodnar, supra note
6, at 553 (writing that “[g]irls complain that boys grab their breasts, purposefully rub up against them,
snap their bras, pull down their pants, catcall to them, make inappropriate remarks like ‘Do me’ and
pass around lists with titles such as ‘Piece of Ass of the Week’”).
11. See Sherer, supra note 10, at 2121 n.13. See generally Louise Fitzgerald, The Prevalence of
Sexual Harassment, in COMBATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION 55 (Bernice Lott &
Mary Ellen Reilly eds., 1996) (providing a collection of articles describing research findings of sexual
harassment of students and female faculty in universities); SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON COLLEGE
CAMPUSES: ABUSING THE IVORY POWER (Michele A. Paludi ed., 1996) (offering a variety of articles
about sexual harassment in higher education).
12. This Note mainly focuses on the implications of Title IX’s potential to preclude Section 1983
claims in the context of sexual harassment in school settings. It is important to note, however, that
sexual harassment is only one form of sex discrimination actionable under Title IX and potentially
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federal laws.13 Victims most often invoke actions through two avenues: (1)
Title IX of the Higher Education Amendments of 197214 and (2) 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,15 based on a constitutional privilege or as a claim predicated on the
violation of Title IX itself.16 However, Title IX and § 1983 differ in their
potential to aid students harmed by sex discrimination in school settings.
Understanding the distinction between Title IX and § 1983 elucidates the
scope of vindication each statute provides victims. Moreover, these statutes’
remedial differences highlight the importance of the topic of this Note.
Currently, federal courts are split on whether a plaintiff asserting a Title IX
claim may also assert a § 1983 claim based on a constitutional privilege or
Title IX itself.17 In many instances, a plaintiff’s ability to assert a § 1983
actionable under § 1983. This Note focuses on cases of sexual harassment as opposed to other forms of
discrimination, such as admissions policies, because cases of sexual harassment will more likely
involve constitutional violations that must be asserted through § 1983 to implicate individual violators
whom victims may want to sue in their individual and official capacities.
13. See Sherer, supra note 10, at 2143 (noting that because most schools do not have sexual
harassment policies and procedures, and only two states have legislation regarding sexual harassment
in educational settings, victims must seek recourse at the federal level). Federally protected rights that
may be relevant for students suffering from sexual discrimination in school settings include the First
Amendment right to free speech, the Fifth Amendment right to privacy, the Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection and due process of the law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 protection, and Title IX
protection. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified
Sch. Dist., 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
14. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994). Title IX provides in part that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Id.
§ 1681(a).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
16. The Supreme Court held that the “§ 1983 remedy broadly encompasses violations of federal
statutory as well as constitutional law.” Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). The Supreme Court
recently limited Thiboutot’s broad holding, stating that “[i]n order to seek redress through § 1983 . . . a
plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Blessing v.
Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Even before Thiboutot, the Supreme Court recognized that
individuals have an implied private right of action under Title IX. Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 689 (1979). For an overview of state claims that may be brought in the Title IX context,
see Eriksson, supra note 6, at 1804-05.
17. When bringing an action for violation of Title IX, some courts preclude a plaintiff from
asserting an additional claim under § 1983 for a violation of Title IX itself or other constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding Title IX
preempts a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause against school officials in their official and personal capacities); Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751,
758 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that individuals may not assert Title IX derivatively through § 1983 for
sex-based employment discrimination because other civil rights remedial schemes, such as Title VII,
provide a comprehensive remedy); Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d
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claim in addition to a Title IX claim is critical to the scope of vindication a
plaintiff may seek for sexual harassment in a school setting.
First, a victim of sexual harassment may want to seek redress under
Cir. 1993) (holding that Title IX precludes § 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause against the school district); Pfeiffer v. Marion Center Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d
779, 789 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that Title IX precludes Section 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth
Amendment against the school district and its officials in both their official and personal capacity);
Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 740, 768 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(precluding claims brought under § 1983 for violating the Equal Protection Clause, but not similarly
doing so for § 1983 claims based on violations of First Amendment rights); Seneway v. Canon
McMillan Sch. Dist., 969 F. Supp. 325, 330-31 (W.D. Pa. 1997), appeal quashed, 118 F.3d 1577 (3d
Cir. 1997) (precluding constitutionally based claims brought under § 1983 against the school district,
but allowing them to proceed against individuals in their personal capacities); Bruneau v. South
Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 179 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff may not
bring a § 1983 claim based upon the violation of Title IX itself); Nelson v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 914 F.
Supp. 643, 648 (D. Me. 1996) (holding that Title IX subsumes all statutorily and constitutionally based
§ 1983 claims in addition to a First Amendment constitutional claim); Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F.
Supp. 53, 59 (D. Conn. 1995) (precluding § 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment against
the school district and its officials in their official and individual capacities); Mann v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (dismissing § 1983 claims based on the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses against the university and its
officials in their official capacities but allowing them to proceed against the officials in their personal
capacities); Mabry v. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ., 597 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (D.
Colo. 1984) (holding in dicta that it would have precluded § 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses against the school and its officials in their
official and individual capacities).
Other courts have held that Title IX does not preclude § 1983 claims predicated on constitutional
or Title IX violations. See, e.g., Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1284 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
Title IX does not preclude claims brought under § 1983 for a violation of either the Fourteenth
Amendment or Title IX itself against university officials in their official and individual capacities);
Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 723-24 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title IX does
not preclude § 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive Due Process Clause
against state actors in their official and individual capacities and implying, in dicta, that Title IX would
not preclude § 1983 claims based on Title IX itself); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F.
Supp. 1369, 1378-81, 1386-87 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (same); Oona v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp.
1452, 1462 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX violations may be
asserted under § 1983 against individuals in their official and individual capacities).
A third line of cases holds that Title IX may bar a claim brought under § 1983 for a violation of
Title IX itself, but does not absolutely bar claims brought under § 1983 for constitutional violations.
See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that constitutionally based § 1983
claims are not barred by Title IX, but § 1983 claims for violations of Title IX itself are precluded
against individual officials in their individual or official capacities); Carrol K. v. Fayette County Bd. of
Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (holding that Title IX does not preclude § 1983
claim based on the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process against individuals in their official and
personal capacities); Alston v. Va. High Sch. League, 176 F.R.D. 220, 223-24 (W.D. Va. 1997)
(holding that Title IX does not preclude Section 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment
right to equal protection against individuals in their official and personal capacities); Does v.
Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 573-74 & n.15 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that
Title IX does not preempt § 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due
process or Title IX itself but dismissing Title IX claim brought derivatively under § 1983 against
individuals in their official capacities as duplicitous and unnecessary, and precluding § 1983 claims
based on Title IX against individuals in their individual capacities).
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§ 1983 for violation of Title IX because the burden of proof under § 1983
may be less onerous. Under Title IX, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant
acted with actual knowledge and deliberate indifference.18 Whereas under
§ 1983, a plaintiff who proves that a defendant acted with gross negligence
may sufficiently create a prima facie case.19
Secondly, most courts agree that Title IX holds only governing entities
and their officials responsible for sexual harassment in schools. Officials in
their personal capacities are not liable under Title IX.20 Section 1983,
however, creates individual liability for violators acting under color of state
law who infringe on either a constitutional privilege, such as the Fourteenth
Amendment’s right to equal protection, or a federal statute, such as Title IX
itself.21 The difference in whom plaintiffs can sue under Title IX versus
§ 1983 is important to victims. This is especially true in the context of sexual
harassment, where victims often want to seek judgment against their
18. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-91, (1998) (holding that
school districts are not liable under Title IX for sexual harassment by teachers absent deliberate
indifference to actual notice of a Title IX violation); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S.
629, 650-52 (1999) (holding that a student alleging a violation of Title IX for sexual harassment by
other students must show that the educational institution actually knew of and deliberately ignored
redressing the violation).
19. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 20 (1999). “In a suit under 42 USCS § 1983, the plaintiff
need not prove that the defendant acted willfully or with a specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of a
federal right.” Id. Most courts hold that grossly or culpably negligent conduct depriving a plaintiff of a
federal right supports an action under § 1983. Id. A few courts hold that merely negligent conduct, in
appropriate circumstances, will support an action under the statute. Id.
20. Often, a student will want to sue several individual employees such as teachers, coaches,
principals, superintendents, school board members, and governing entities such as a school district or
municipality for sex discrimination. See Smith v. Metro. Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014,
1018-19 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir.
1996)); Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 730 (6th Cir. 1996) (Nelson, J.,
concurring); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 884, 901 (1st Cir. 1988); Burrow v. Postville
Comm. Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1207 (N.D. Iowa 1996); Nelson v. Temple Univ., 920 F. Supp
633, 638 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Clay v. Bd. of Trs. of Neosho County Cmt’y Coll., 905 F. Supp. 1488, 1495
(D. Kan. 1995); Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142, 145-46 (W.D. Tex. 1994); Doe v.
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993)) (finding that a “majority of the
courts that considered the issue had concluded that only a grant recipient can violate Title IX,” not
individuals). But see Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 56 (D. Conn. 1995) (contending that Title
IX does not restrict the potential class of defendants to institutions and may be enforceable against
“persons” who exercise sufficient control over a Title IX program or activity); Mann v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44, 45-46 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (same).
21. See supra Part III. Under § 1983, states or state officials in their official capacities are usually
protected from damage claims by asserting their Eleventh Amendment immunity. Furthermore,
political subdivisions may not be held vicariously liable for actions of their officers, agents, or
employees. Thus, actions are most frequently brought against individual government officials acting
“under color of state law.” These state actors are usually protected by a qualified immunity to the
extent that “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.” See McDonald, infra note 68, at 32.
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harassers in their individual capacities.22 Sexual harassment is extremely
personal and victims often want to see the blame placed on the individual
harasser rather than the abstract educational institution that condoned the
behavior.
Part II of this Note details Title IX’s legislative purpose, framework, and
judicial development to the present day. Part III discusses § 1983’s
legislative purpose, framework, and relevant case law development, as well
as the various claims that may arise under § 1983 in the context of a Title IX
violation. Part IV describes how Title IX may preclude a plaintiff from also
asserting violations of constitutional and statutory rights under § 1983. Part V
provides an exposition of case law interpreting whether Title IX precludes
constitutional or statutory § 1983 claims. Part VI analyzes the courts’
inconsistent treatment of Title IX and § 1983 claims, presenting the strengths
and weaknesses in the courts’ rationales. Part VII proposes a comprehensive
approach to solve the federal courts’ inconsistency in this preclusion
problem. This Note argues that Title IX should preclude a plaintiff from
asserting a § 1983 claim based upon a Title IX violation, but should not
preclude a plaintiff from asserting any type of constitutional violation under
§ 1983. This proposal maintains the integrity and goals of Title IX while also
providing a victim of sex discrimination with the opportunity to seek
vindication from her discriminators in their individual capacities.
II. TITLE IX
A. Statutory Overview
In response to the pervasive problems of sex discrimination in educational
institutions and a then-existing gap in civil rights legislation,23 Congress
enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.24 The purpose of
Title IX is to “avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory
practices” and “provide individual citizens effective protection against those
practices” in educational settings.25
Presently, courts interpret Title IX and federal regulations promulgated
22. See, e.g., supra notes 17, 20.
23. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 n.16, 704-07 (1979); see also, Ericksson,
supra note 6, at 1803. “The data presented to Congress during the Title IX debates clearly showed that
women were being discriminated against in the field of education . . . .” Id. Further, “Congress planned
to fill the void left by Title VI . . . .” Id.
24. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994). See supra note 14.
25. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704.
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under Title IX to redress sex discrimination26 in any educational institution27
receiving federal funds28 for any program or activity.29 Additionally, Title IX
and its supplementary regulations cover sex discrimination in any
educational program or activity receiving federal funds that is not sponsored
or offered by an educational institution.30 Title IX excludes certain
educational institutions with other purposes, such as military and religious
entities.31
B. Administrative Enforcement and Relief
Title IX’s regulations establish two steps to protect against sex
discrimination in educational institutions: voluntary compliance or federal
funding termination.32 The Office of Civil Rights (OCR), a division of the
Department of Education (DOE), is responsible for the administrative
enforcement of Title IX33 as prescribed by the DOE regulations promulgated
26. The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the Department of Education (DOE) interprets sex
discrimination to include unequal access to admission and employment based on one’s sex in
academia; unequal access to facilities in athletic programs based on one’s sex; sexual harassment by
teachers, students, and third parties; and any discrimination against pregnant or married students. 34
C.F.R. §§ 106.21 (employment provision), .41, .37(c) (harassment), .40 (1999); Department of
Education, OCR, Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other
Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,033, 12,039 (March 13, 1997). Judicial interpretations of
sex discrimination in schools are similar. See Pamela W. Kernie, Comment, Protecting Individuals
from Sex Discrimination: Compensatory Relief Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,
67 WASH. L. REV. 155, 158 (1992) (providing case examples where discrimination in parental or
marital status, athletics, admission policies or employment, and sexual harassment are commonly
litigated issues under Title IX). Moreover, courts have held that if Congress leaves a gap in legislation
for an agency to fill, then courts should defer to agency regulations “unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Paul Sweeney, Abuse Misuse & Abrogation of the
Use of Legislative History: Title IX and Peer Sexual Harassment, 66 UMKC L. REV. 41, 68 (1997)
(quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
27. An educational institution under Title IX is defined as “any public or private preschool,
elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, professional or higher education.” 20
U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1994).
28. Federal financial assistance includes student loans, scholarships, grants, money for
construction and repair of buildings, sales or leases of federal property at reduced cost, provisions of
federal personnel services, and on-the-job training programs. 45 C.F.R. § 86.2(g) (1990).
29. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 expressly mandated that the Title IX prohibition of
sex discrimination applies to “all the operations” in an educational institution if “any part of” the
institution “is extended federal financial assistance.” Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1987 (1994)).
30. See Kernie, supra note 26, at 158.
31. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 106.12(a) (1999) (exempting religious
institutions with organizational tenets that conflict with Title IX provisions); see also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a)(4) (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 106.13 (1999) (exempting institutions devoted to training individuals
for United States military service).
32. See 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (1999).
33. See 20 U.S.C. § 3413 (1994); Kaiji Clark, Note, School Liability and Compensation for Title
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under Title IX. The DOE regulations require schools34 to create and publish
grievance procedures that promptly address and redress sex discrimination
complaints.35 In addition, each school must designate a person to manage the
school’s Title IX compliance efforts.36
Any person who suffers a form of sex discrimination in a federally funded
educational setting may file a complaint under the school’s grievance
procedure or with the DOE.37 Complaints to the DOE must be filed within
180 days38 of the Title IX violation. The complaint may include a substantive
claim concerning incidents involving sexually discriminatory conduct and a
procedural claim that the school failed to respond to complaints of sex
discrimination.39 After a complainant files a report with the DOE, the OCR
reviews and investigates the complaint and determines whether the recipient
violated Title IX or its enforcement regulations.40 If the OCR finds that no
violation occurred, then the DOE takes no further action on the complaint.41
Alternatively, if the OCR finds that the school violated Title IX or its
enforcement regulations, then the OCR seeks voluntary compliance from the
school.42
When a school refuses to comply with Title IX after informal
negotiations, the OCR can commence administrative proceedings against the
school. These proceedings include a hearing, a review by the OCR’s Civil
Rights Reviewing Authority, and a final review by the Secretary of
IX Sexual Harassment Violations by Teachers and Peers, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 356 (1998).
34. Although Title IX applies to educational programs that receive federal funds but are not
necessarily sponsored by a school, most Title IX cases involve schools or other educational
institutions. For the purposes of this Note, “schools” include all entities and programs covered under
Title IX.
35. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1996).
36. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) provides in part:
Each recipient shall designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and
carry out its responsibilities under this part, including any investigation of any complaint
communicated to such recipient alleging its noncompliance with this part or alleging any actions
that would be prohibited by this part. The recipient shall notify all its students and employees of
the name, office address and telephone number of the employee or employees appointed pursuant
to this paragraph.
34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (1996).
37. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b) (1999). A complainant may immediately file a complaint with the DOE,
regardless of any effort to redress her complaint through an educational institution’s internal grievance
procedure. See Sherer, supra note 10, at 2145 n.135.
38. See Sherer, supra note 10, at 2145 n.135 (noting that under 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b), a DOE
official may extend the statute of limitation).
39. See Sherer, supra note 10, at 2145.
40. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c),(d) (1999).
41. Id. § 100.7(d)(2).
42. Id. § 100.7(d)(1).
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Education.43 If administrative proceedings result in a finding that the school’s
conduct violated Title IX, the school’s federal funding may be terminated.44
However, an administrative proceeding under Title IX does not provide a
victim with any personal compensation.45
C. Judicial Enforcement and Relief
Unlike administrative proceedings,46 federal courts allow victims to seek
compensatory and punitive damages47 and attorney fees48 for violations of
Title IX.49 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,50 the Supreme Court held that
an individual can maintain a private right of action against an educational
institution for a violation of Title IX.51 In its rationale, the Court emphasized
43. Id. §§ 100.8(a), .10. In place of administrative enforcement proceedings, the DOE may
relegate the case to the Department of Justice to seek enforcement of Title IX in the courts. See Sherer,
supra note 10, at 2146.
44. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994); 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(a)-(c) (1999). It is important to note that
“[n]o institution has ever lost its funding under Title IX, and only in a few cases has funding been
delayed pending compliance.” Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 85, 116 (1992). One
commentator reasons that withdrawing federal funds from schools further punishes the students who
experienced discrimination by taking away funds that would be used to educate them. Additionally,
the commentator points out that the government realizes the victim may seek redress through other
remedies provided by case law. See Bodnar, supra note 6, at 571.
45. See Clark, supra note 33, at 357. Administrative remedies only provide equitable relief such
as maintaining school compliance with Title IX by establishing effective grievance procedures or
prohibiting discriminatory conduct by dismissing offenders. Further, the OCR and the school settle
these disputes without the agreement or participation of the complainant. However, the federal
government underwrites the DOE’s investigation and enforcement efforts. See Sherer, supra note 10,
at 2150-51. Lastly, students will often be denied the opportunity to experience vindication in seeing a
change in the school’s policy because the realization of benefits gained from administrative
proceedings, such as school policy reforms, often occur after a student has left the institution. See
Ellison, supra note 6, at 2059 n.51. For a good assessment of the benefits and disadvantages of the
OCR, see Setty, infra note 46.
46. A victim may initiate proceedings administratively with the OCR or in federal court. One
avenue is not exclusive of the other. See Sudha Setty, Note, Leveling the Playing Field: Reforming the
Office for Civil Rights to Achieve Better Title IX Enforcement, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 331,
336 (1999) (noting that Title IX plaintiffs do not have to exhaust administrative remedies with internal
grievance or OCR procedures before filing a private lawsuit).
47. See generally infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
48. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976 authorizes an award of fees to
prevailing parties in actions to enforce Title IX. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)).
49. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
50. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
51. See id. at 709. In drawing its conclusion, the Court examined the legislative history and
purpose in enacting Title IX. Id. at 694-96. The Court noted that Congressmen, particularly Senator
Bayh, discussed that Title IX patterned itself on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 694
n.16. The Court then reasoned that Congress must have known that the judiciary recognized an implied
right of action under Title VI and therefore intended for the same implied right of action to apply
under Title IX. Id. at 696-98.
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that a private right of action, as opposed to the severe remedy of terminating
federal funding, would be more practical in redressing an isolated instance of
sex discrimination in an educational institution.52 The Court stated that in
addition to the already existing administrative remedies, a private right of
action would further enhance the possibility of achieving Title IX’s goals to
end sex discrimination in educational institutions.53 It would not only
“provide individual citizens [with] effective protection,”54 but also ensure
“orderly enforcement of the statute.”55
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Cannon, in which it found an
implied private right of action under Title IX, Congress essentially ratified
the Court’s holding by subsequently enacting two legislative provisions that
did not interfere with that implied right.56 First, the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 198657 abrogated state Eleventh Amendment immunity
under Title IX without distinguishing between cases brought by the DOE and
those brought by individual plaintiffs.58 By abrogating Eleventh Amendment
immunity to Title IX, Congress opened the door for Title IX plaintiffs to
bring their cause of action in federal courts against state institutions, thus
implicitly approving the implied private right of action.
Second, in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Congress
unequivocally mandated that the judiciary should give Title IX a “broad
It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the
law; in this case, because of their repeated references to Title VI and its modes of enforcement, we
are especially justified in presuming both that those representatives were aware of the prior
interpretation of Title VI and that that interpretation reflects their intent with respect to Title IX.
Id. at 696-98.
52. Id. at 704-05.
53. See id. at 706 n.41.
54. Id. at 704.
55. Id. at 06.
56. See Franklin v. Gwinett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 72 (1992). “In the years after
the announcement of Cannon’s holding . . . Congress was legislating with full cognizance of that
decision. . . . This statute cannot be read except as a validation of Cannon’s holding.” Id.
57. Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1845, 1845 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994)).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988) provides that “[a] State shall not be immune under the Eleventh
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal Court for a violation of . . .
Title IX . . . or the provisions of any other Federal Statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of
Federal financial assistance.” Id. § 2000d-7(a)(1). Subsequent case law holds this statute
constitutional. See Thorpe v. Va. State Univ., 6 F. Supp. 2d 507, 516 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that
Congress unequivocally expressed its intention to abrogate the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
and, in doing so, it “could have enacted Title IX under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment”); cf.
Litman v. George Mason Univ., 5 F. Supp. 2d 366, 374, 376 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that Congress
passed Title IX pursuant to its power under the Spending Clause and not pursuant to the Equal
Protection Clause, because Title IX affords protection to “a greater range of defendants” from “a
greater range of conduct” than the Equal Protection Clause and however, Congress may “require the
States to waive their [Eleventh Amendment] immunity pursuant to a valid exercise of its spending
power”) Id.
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application,” holding liable any program that discriminates on the basis of
sex in an institution that receives federal funds, regardless of whether that
particular discriminatory program receives federal funds.59 These two
subsequent enactments, both clarifying and expanding a plaintiff’s ability to
sue educational institutions under Title IX, indicated to the Court that
Congress approved of providing broad redress to victims and an implied
private right of action under Title IX.60
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,61 the Supreme Court
further strengthened a victim’s redress under Title IX by unanimously
holding that a person could receive both compensatory and punitive damages
in a private action for sex discrimination.62 The Court presumed that
Congress knew of the longstanding general rule that federal courts may
award any appropriate relief in a cause of action brought pursuant to a federal
statute.63 The Court noted that, when enacting the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986 and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Congress had ample opportunity to abrogate the implied private right of
action found in Cannon. Instead, Congress remained silent and actually
expanded the breadth of Title IX.64 In this context, the Court concluded that
implicit congressional approval of the implied right of action under Title IX
mandated that courts provide all necessary and appropriate relief to enforce
and redress Title IX violations.65
III. SECTION 1983
A. Purpose, Framework, and Case Law Development
Section 1983,66 otherwise known as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,67
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988); Act of Mar. 22, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 2, 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. (102 Stat.) 28. For example, if a science center at a university receives federal funds for
medical research, then any department or program in that university may be subject to liability under
Title IX regardless of whether or not that particular department or program receives federal funding.
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 expanded the scope of liability in federally funded
institutions, signaling to the courts that Congress approved of providing a broad redress for Title IX
victims. The Act also did not differentiate between cases where the DOE or an individual brought a
cause of action to federal court.
60. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
61. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
62. Id. at 76.
63. Id. at 66.
64. Id. at 70.
65. Id. at 69.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
67. For a discussion regarding the Act’s enactment, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4
(1980).
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provides a vehicle for individuals to vindicate rights secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.68 During the Reconstruction Era,
Congress enacted § 1983 to provide a federal remedy in an impartial forum
for state violations of the constitutional rights guaranteed to U.S. citizens.69
At that time, Congress hoped that § 1983 would protect individuals of color
from violence in the South and guarantee protection of their rights secured by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 1983 does not contain substantive rights like Title IX.70 Title IX
specifies a substantive right for U.S. citizens to be free from sex
discrimination in educational settings.71 On the other hand, § 1983 provides
citizens with a method to vindicate constitutional72 and other federal rights.73
To assert a constitutional or federal law violation under § 1983, a plaintiff
must establish two elements: (1) the violator acted under the color of state
law,74 and (2) the violator’s action deprived the victim of a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.75 To
prove the second prong, a plaintiff must allege all of the elements of the
constitutional or federal right.76
B. The Use of § 1983 in Title IX Cases
Plaintiffs commonly frame their allegations of sexual harassment and
discrimination in educational settings as constitutional and federal law
violations under § 1983. They often base their § 1983 claims on the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection77 and Due Process Clauses,78 the
68. See Daniel J. McDonald, A Primer on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, UTAH B.J., May 1999, at 29; see
also Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4 (holding that the § 1983 remedy encompasses violations of federal
statutory as well as constitutional rights).
69. See Thiboutot, 400 U.S. at 4.
70. See McDonald, supra note 68, at 30.
71. See supra Part II.A.
72. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (holding that no claim is cognizable under
§ 1983 unless there is a violation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution).
73. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (holding that a plaintiff must assert a
violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law).
74. Action taken under the color of state law refers to conduct by a person acting within the
authority conferred by state law. 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 18 (1999).
75. See McDonald, supra note 68, at 30.
76. For instance, to assert a violation of Title IX under § 1983 against a political subdivision, a
plaintiff must establish that (1) an institution of an educational nature, (2) receiving federal funds, (3)
discriminated on the basis of sex, (4) with actual notice of and deliberate indifference to such conduct.
See supra notes 18, 26-30 and accompanying text. On the other hand, to assert a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause under § 1983 for sexual harassment, a plaintiff must
show intentional discrimination. See supra note 19; infra note 77.
77. A plaintiff asserting a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection
under the law essentially duplicates her claim under Title IX, by alleging that she has a right to be free
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from sex discrimination in state-operated educational institutions. See Zwibelman, infra note 83, at
1480. To prove a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause violation against a state educational
institution or its supervisory officials in their official capacities, a plaintiff must establish the
institution’s culpability. This burden can be met if the actions of a final policymaker caused the
violation, or if a final policymaker sanctioned a state actor’s conduct or if a state actor’s conduct was
part of a broader policy of conduct condoned against the plaintiff. This policy must constitute a
“custom or usage with the force of law.” See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
(1997) (holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipality was the “moving force”
behind the alleged injury); McDonald, supra note 68, at 31. See also Connie C. Flores, Comment, The
Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX: A Solution to Peer Sexual Harassment, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 153,
177-78 (1997). Further, the Equal Protection Clause is not a remedy for sexual harassment itself, but it
requires institutions to investigate claims on an equal basis regardless of gender. Thus, most often a
plaintiff will assert that the institution’s failure to investigate and address the plaintiff’s complaints of
sexual harassment violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Trudy Bredthauer, Twenty-Five Years
Under Title IX: Have We Made Progress?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1107, 1110 (1998). Thus, a
plaintiff will often have to show that an educational institution administered a facially neutral school
policy in an intentionally discriminatory manner by relying on hard found evidence such as the
legislative history of school policies and patterns of administrative behavior. See Flores, supra note 77,
 at 179. By contrast, to prove an equal protection violation by a supervisory official in his individual
capacity (a right a majority of the courts believe is not protected under Title IX), a plaintiff must
establish that the state actor’s failure to investigate the plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment amounted
to gross negligence. In this context, gross negligence may be equated with deliberate indifference to a
right that the state actor “knew or should have known.” Therefore, in contrast to Title IX’s requirement
of actual notice in addition to deliberate indifference to establish a Title IX violation, to prove a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff need only prove deliberate indifference. See
Zwibelman, infra note 83, at 1466-67; see also supra notes 18, 19, 77 and accompanying text. For
cases asserting both a Title IX and Equal Protection claim, see Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281,
1283 (8th Cir. 1997); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 1990); Williams v.
Sch. Dist. of Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1993); Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Sch. Dist., 917
F.2d 779, 789 (3d. Cir. 1990); Kemether v. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc. 15 F. Supp. 2d 740
(E.D. Pa. 1998); Seneway v. Canon McMillan Sch. Dist., 969 F. Supp. 325, 330; Alston v. Va. High
Sch. League, 176 F.R.D. 220, 223 (W.D. Va. 1997); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F.
Supp. 1369, 1382-84 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Oona v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp.  1452 (N.D. Cal.
1995); Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995).
78. Plaintiffs may allege violations of their right to due process, such as a fair hearing, or
violations of their right to substantive due process, for example, a deprivation of education, privacy, or
bodily integrity. See Zwibelman, infra note 83, at 1479; Flores, supra note 77, at 180-82. To establish
a violation under procedural or substantive due process, a plaintiff must prove that the state actor knew
or should have known that his conduct deprived a student from a protected constitutional right. See
Adam Greenfield, Note, Annie Get Your Gun ‘Cause Help Ain’t Coming’: The Need for Constitutional
Protection From Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DUKE L.J. 588, 595 (1993). The word “deprive”
involves more than negligence, it also implies a deliberate decision of a government official. See
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Most courts agree that sexual abuse by a state actor
violates a student’s bodily integrity under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch.
Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 143 (5th Cir. 1992), vacated en banc, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
“[b]odily integrity is necessarily compromised when a state actor sexually assaults a schoolchild”);
Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding “[r]easonable
officials would have understood the ‘contours’ of a student’s right to bodily integrity, under the Due
Process Clause, to encompass a student’s right to be free from sexual assault by his or her teachers”).
However, claims that schools deprive students of their bodily integrity when such students are sexually
abused by other students are not considered violations of the students’ right to due process. See D.R. v.
Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1376 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding that § 1983
does not apply where underlying wrongful acts are committed by students and not state actors).
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First Amendment,79 and Title IX.80 Plaintiffs may bring § 1983 claims
against political subdivisions, officials of a political subdivision in their
official capacities (officials), or officials of a political subdivision in their
individual capacities (individuals).81 Most often, victims of sexual abuse or
Moreover, it is unclear whether a plaintiff claiming a deprivation of the liberty interest to be free
from constant sexual harassment, without sexual assault or abuse, will be successful. Whether it
deprives a student from a sufficient liberty or property interest has not been greatly litigated in federal
courts or heard by the Supreme Court. See Sherer, supra note 10, at 2143 n. 130. For cases asserting
Title IX and due process violations, see Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996);
Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724-26; Seneway, 969 F. Supp. at 331-35; Carroll
K. v. Fayette County Bd. of Edu., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (S.D.W. Va. 1998); and Mennone, 889 F.
Supp. 53.
79. In order to prove a violation of First Amendment rights, a plaintiff must first establish that a
First Amendment violation has occurred. To accommodate First Amendment rights in a school setting,
the Supreme Court has held that a student’s expression may be restricted when the conduct “in class or
out of it, which for any reason— whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior— materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others . . . . [However],
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint” does not justify suppression of a particular opinion. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 509, 513 (1969). A plaintiff must show that the First Amendment right was clearly
established at the time of the defendant’s actions. The Tenth Circuit has held that for a law to be
“clearly established” that “there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the
clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains.” Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1238 (citing Medina v. City & County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493,
1498 (10th Cir. 1992)). One commentator has pointed out that in “emerging, complex, or confused
areas of the law, like the First Amendment, where . . . not even members of the Supreme Court are
sure what the law is,” proving that a First Amendment violation was “clearly established” is a daunting
task. See McDonald, supra note 68, at 32. For cases asserting Title IX and First Amendment
violations, see Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1236-37; Lillard, 76 F.3d at 716; Kemether, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 768;
and Nelson v. Univ. of Me., 914 F. Supp 643, 647-48 (D. Me. 1996).
80. To establish a § 1983 claim based on Title IX, a plaintiff must prove that the state actor
“knew or should have known” that he violated a “clearly established” right under Title IX for the
plaintiff to be free from sex discrimination in a federally funded educational program. See McDonald,
supra note 68, at 32; see also supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. This standard lowers the
burden a plaintiff must prove under Title IX against educational institutions and state actors in their
official capacities. Under Title IX, a plaintaiff must prove that the defendant had “actual notice” of the
violation and that he was “deliberately indifferent” to the wrongful conduct. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text. For cases asserting claims under Title IX and § 1983 based upon Title IX
violations, see Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1284; Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1995);
Bruneau v. S. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 178 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Mann v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1385-86; Does v.
Covington County Sch. Bd., 930 F. Supp 554, 572-74 (M.D. Ala. 1996); Oona, 890 F. Supp. at 1459-
62; and Mabry v. State Bd. for Cmty. Coll. & Occupational Edu., 597 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (D.C. Colo.
1984).
81. See Crawford, 109 F.3d at 1284 (suing state actors in their official and individual capacities);
Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1236-37 (suing school district and state employees in their official and individual
capacities); Lillard, 76 F.3d at 716 (suing board of education and the principal, teacher, and coach in
their individual and official capacities); Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 754-55 (suing the institution and its actors
as individuals); Waid, 91 F.3d at 862 (suing school officials as individuals); Williams, 998 F.2d at 170
(suing school district); Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 789 (suing the school district, board of school directors,
and school officials in their official capacities); Carroll K., 19 F. Supp. 2d at 622 (suing board of
education and school officials in their official capacities); Kemether, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 768 (suing the
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harassment in school settings want to sue individuals, rather than political
subdivisions, under § 1983 because § 1983 cases against political
subdivisions are difficult to win82 and because those entities are often liable
as recipients under Title IX. Thus, a victim typically chooses to sue a school
and its officials under Title IX and individuals or officials under § 1983 for
violations of Title IX and other constitutional rights.
IV. STATUTORY PRECLUSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND FEDERAL
VIOLATIONS UNDER § 1983
The Supreme Court determines whether a federal statute such as Title IX
precludes a plaintiff from bringing a separate constitutional or statutory claim
under § 1983 according to the underlying violation asserted.83 First, the test
from Sea Clammers84 evaluates whether a federal statute precludes a plaintiff
from suing indirectly, under § 1983, for a violation of that same federal
statute.85 Second, the test from Smith86 examines whether a federal statute
precludes a plaintiff from bringing a claim under § 1983 based on a
constitutional violation.87
A. Preclusion of a Federal Statutory Claim Under § 1983
A plaintiff may be precluded from bringing a § 1983 claim for a violation
of a statute if:88 (1) the statute at issue does not create an enforceable “right”
within the meaning of “rights, privileges, or immunities” under § 1983, or (2)
statewide athletic association); Seneway, 969 F. Supp. at 331-35 (suing school district and its
administrators in their individual capacities); Nicole M., 964 F. Supp. at 1385-86 (suing school district
and state actors in their official and individual capacities); Alston, 176 F.R.D. at 223 (suing state
school athletic league); Covington, 930 F. Supp. at 572-74 (suing board of education and school
officials in their individual capacities); Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 178 (suing school, school board, and
school officials as individuals); Nelson, 914 F. Supp. at 647-48 (suing the university); Oona, 890 F.
Supp. at 1459-62 (suing school district and state actors in their individual capacities); Mennone, 889 F.
Supp. 53 (suing the school board, superintendent, and teacher in his individual capacity); Mann, 864 F.
Supp. at 47-48 (suing university and university employees in their official and individual capacities);
Mabry, 597 F. Supp. at 1239 (suing institution and its actors in their official capacities).
82. See McDonald, supra note 68, at 31.
83. See Michael A. Zwibelman, Note, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1466 (1998).
84. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). For a
discussion of Sea Clammers, see infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
85. See generally Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1
(1981).
86. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). For a discussion of Smith, see infra notes 99-111
and accompanying text.
87. See generally Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
88. Id.
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if Congress foreclosed private enforcement of the federal statute in the
enactment itself.89
In Sea Clammers,90 the plaintiffs brought claims for injunctive and
monetary relief under § 1983, alleging that various governmental entities and
officials from New York, New Jersey, and the federal government
discharged pollutants in violation of two federal environmental statutes.91
The Court held that the statute in question precluded § 1983 claims based
upon violations of the statute.
The Court examined the statute’s plain language,92 the
comprehensiveness of judicial and administrative remedies,93 and the
relevant legislative history94 to conclude that the statute in question precluded
private enforcement through § 1983. The Court determined that given the
“unusually elaborate enforcement provisions,” including both private suits by
citizens and enforcement by government agencies, Congress intended to
supplant any other private remedy available under § 1983.95 The Court
emphasized that when a state official violates a federal statute that provides
its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, “the requirements of that
enforcement scheme may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under
§ 1983.”96 Since Sea Clammers, the Court has consistently applied the Sea
Clammers holding and rationale to decide whether a federal statute precludes
a plaintiff indirectly asserting violations of that statute under § 1983.97
89. Id. at 19.
90. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
91. Id. at 4-5. The plaintiffs asserted violations of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Id. at 1. The plaintiffs further alleged that New Jersey
and New York violated the terms of the permits issued under those statutes. Id.
92. Id. at 27 n.11.
93. Id. at 20.
94. Id. at 27 n.11, 28.
95. Id. at 21. The “existence of these express remedies . . . demonstrates . . . that Congress
intended to . . . supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under § 1983.” Id. The Court
declined to comment on whether the environmental statutes created a “right” as recognized by § 1983
because Congress expressly foreclosed private enforcement of the acts when it enacted them. Id. at 19.
The Court also found that the existence of the statute’s express remedies also foreclosed implied
private actions under the statute itself. Id. at 21; see also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1003, 1005
(1984). Discussing the Sea Clammers holding, that Court stated:
Where Congress provided comprehensive enforcement mechanisms for protection of a federal
right and those mechanisms did not include a private right to action, a litigant could not obtain a
private right to action by asserting a claim under § 1983 . . . . Sea Clammers had to do only with
an effort to enlarge a statutory remedy by asserting a claim based on that statute under the “and
laws” provision of Section 1983.
Id.
96. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20.
97. See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987) (stating that
§ 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal statutory rights unless “express provision or
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B. Preclusion of a Constitutional Claim Under § 1983
In Smith v. Robinson, 98 the Supreme Court adopted a two-prong test to
determine whether a federal statute precludes a plaintiff from asserting
constitutional violations under § 1983 against a state entity.99 The petitioner
in Smith,100 an eight-year-old boy with cerebral palsy, filed a complaint
asserting violations of the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses under § 1983.101 The petitioner
claimed that the school committee’s decision to remove him from a day
program at the hospital violated his right to due process and to a free and
appropriate education.102 The petitioner used the same set of facts to assert a
claim under both § 1983 and the EHA against the school committee and
some of its officials.103 The Court stated that if the constitutional violation
asserted is “virtually identical” to the plaintiff’s statutory right, and Congress
intended the statute to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff
should find redress, then the remedy provided under the statute subsumes the
remedy for a constitutional violation under § 1983.104 Furthermore, the Court
noted that preclusion of a citizen’s reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for equal
protection or due process would be grave decision.105
The Court found that the constitutional claims asserted by the petitioner in
Smith were virtually identical to the statutory EHA claims.106 Additionally,
the Court found that the legislative history of the EHA indicated Congress’s
intent to design the EHA as the “exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff
may assert an equal protection claim to a free and appropriate education.”107
The Court reasoned that the carefully tailored administrative and judicial
other specific evidence from the statute itself [shows] that Congress intended to foreclose such private
enforcement itself”); see also Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1992) (stating that § 1983 may
not enforce a violation of a federal statute “where Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the
statute in the enactment itself”) (citing Wright, 479 U.S. at 423).
98. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
99. See Zwibelman, supra note 83, at 1466.
100. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
101. Id. at 994.
102. Id. at 998.
103. Id. at 1009.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1012.
106. The plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claims against the school committee and
state officials in their official capacities arose out of the same set of facts leading to the plaintiff’s
claims against the same parties under the Education of the Handicapped Act. The Education of the
Handicapped Act also grants the right to due process and a free and appropriate education. Smith, 468
U.S.  at 992, 1009.
107. Id. at 1009, 1013 & n.16.
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mechanisms in the statute expressly communicated Congress’s intent to
preclude reliance on § 1983.108 The Court emphasized that EHA
administrative hearings “effect[ed] Congress’[s] intent that each child’s
individual education needs be worked out through a process that begins on
the local level and includes ongoing parent involvement, detailed procedural
safeguards, and a right to judicial review.”109 The Court concluded that
allowing a plaintiff to bring a § 1983 claim based on violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment would permit a plaintiff to circumvent the
procedures Congress believed would best aid the States in their compliance
with constitutional obligations to provide a “free and appropriate” education
for handicapped children.110
C. Conclusion
The federal statutes in both Sea Clammers and Smith did not implicate the
most serious problem that arises when plaintiffs use § 1983 to assert a
violation of Title IX. Plaintiffs often try to sue individuals under § 1983 for a
violation of Title IX because Title IX itself does not permit claims against
individuals. Therefore, although courts should apply the Sea Clammers and
Smith tests to decide preclusion, there are additional considerations the courts
should evaluate as well.
V. CASE LAW INTERPRETING WHETHER TITLE IX PRECLUDES § 1983
CLAIMS
A. Five Circuits, Three Ways
Case law addressing whether Title IX precludes § 1983 claims falls into
three categories. First, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit holds that
Title IX precludes neither constitutionally nor statutorily based § 1983
claims.111 Second, the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits find
108. Id. at 1009-10. See also infra text accompanying note 109.
109. Id. at 1011. The Court determined that if a plaintiff’s EHA statutory rights did not subsume
the constitutional rights asserted by the petitioner, then the petitioner could effectively curtail the
“detailed procedural protections outlined in the statute” and avoid Congress’s “view that the needs of
the handicapped children are best accommodated by having the parents and the local education agency
work together to formulate an individualized plan for each handicapped child’s education.” Id. at 1012.
Congress perceived the EHA’s “administrative remedies . . . as the most effective vehicle for
protecting the constitutional right of a handicapped child to public education.” Id. at 1013.
110. Id. at 1012.
111. Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281 (8th Cir. 1997). In Crawford, a student, Michelle
Crawford, turned to several instructors at the University of Central Arkansas for help regarding several
incidents that she believed constituted sexual harassment by her instructor, Michael Davis. Ms.
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that Title IX precludes statutorily based but not constitutionally based § 1983
claims.112 Third, the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Seventh Circuits
Crawford then filed a formal complaint citing the university’s sexual harassment policy. The
university heard Ms. Crawford’s grievance and recommended that Mr. Davis be fired. The university
fired the instructor, but Ms. Crawford remained unsatisfied with the school’s resolution. Ms. Crawford
then filed suit under Title IX and § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. She sued the university, the university president in his official capacity, the
university president’s assistant in his official and individual capacities, and Mr. Davis in his individual
and official capacities for inadequately responding to her complaints of sexual harassment. Id. at 1282.
In the district court, the defendants moved for summary judgment asserting Eleventh Amendment
qualified immunity. The district court granted defendants’ motion in part and denied it in part, leaving
three sets of claims: (1) § 1983 claim for injunctive relief against the university and defendants
Williams and Thompson in their official capacities, (2) § 1983 claim for damages against defendants
Williams and Davis in their individual capacities, and (3) a Title IX claim against the university and
defendants Williams, Thompson, and Davis in their official capacities. The university and defendants
Williams and Thompson in their official capacities appealed the denial of their Eleventh Amendment
qualified immunity. Id. at 1282. On appeal, the defendants argued that under Sea Clammers, Ms.
Crawford’s Title IX claims subsumed her § 1983 claims. Id. at 1283. More specifically, the defendants
asserted that the Sea Clammers holding precluded most of Ms. Crawford’s § 1983 claims based on
Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause, except for her Title IX claims against the university and
defendants Williams, Thompson, and Davis in their official capacities. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Sea Clammers “in no way restricts a
plaintiff’s ability to seek redress via § 1983 for violations of independently existing constitutional
rights, even if the same set of facts gives rise to a cause of action [under Title IX].” See id. at 1284. In
this case, the Eighth Circuit distinguished between constitutional rights and Title IX rights, both of
which can be asserted under § 1983. The court further determined that even if the plaintiff’s § 1983
claims were based on Title IX itself, the Sea Clammers doctrine would not preclude a § 1983 claim
based on Title IX because Title IX is not a “sufficiently comprehensive” statute within the meaning of
the Sea Clammers doctrine. Id. at 1284. But see Does v. Covington County School Bd., 930 F. Supp.
554, 573-74 & n.15 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that (1) Title IX does not preempt § 1983 claims based
on Title IX against individuals in their official capacities but opining those claims would be dismissed
as duplicitous, and (2) § 1983 claims based on Title IX against individuals in their individual
capacities would be barred because such claims would “allow plaintiffs to gain remedies not available
under Title IX and to circumvent congressional intent to foreclose such Title IX actions”); cf. Seneway
v. Canon McMillan School Dist., 969 F. Supp. at 325, 330 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (dismissing § 1983 claims
based on Fourteenth Amendment violations against the university and its officials in their official
capacities because Title IX sufficiently addresses those claims, but allowing such constitutionally
based § 1983 claims to proceed against state actors in their personal capacities); Mann v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (same).
The Crawford court emphasized that the statute only provided a procedure to terminate federal
funding, not an “unusually elaborate enforcement provision” that expressly provided for citizen suits
and administrative enforcement procedures like the statute at issue in Sea Clammers. Crawford, 109
F.3d at 1284. Lastly, the court pointed out that the Supreme Court’s judicial holdings in Cannon and
Franklin expanding the remedies provided by Title IX, indicated that Title IX’s statutory remedial
mechanism is not exclusive. Id. See also Oona v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1461 (N.D.
Cal. 1995) (citing to language in the Supreme Court’s Cannon opinion describing Title IX’s lack of
comprehensiveness and reasoning that the Court’s holding in Franklin, allowing monetary damages
for Title IX violations implicitly rejected the assertion that Title IX’s remedial mechanisms are so
comprehensive that they preclude other remedies); Nicole M. v. Martinez Unified Sch. Dist., 964 F.
Supp. 1369, 1380 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (same). Crawford is controlling in the Eighth Circuit, which
remains the only circuit to find that Title IX does not preclude constitutionally or statutorily based
§ 1983 claims, stands alone in its evaluation of the relationship between Title IX and Section 1983.
112. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996); Lillard v. Shelby, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir.
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1996). In Seamons, five upper-class teammates grabbed the plaintiff as he came out of the shower,
forcibly restrained and bound him to a towel rack with adhesive tape, and then brought in a girl he had
dated to view him. 84 F.3d at 1230. All the other teammates watched this episode happen to the
plaintiff. Id. When the plaintiff reported the incident to school administrators, the football coach
scolded the plaintiff before the entire football team for reporting the incident. The coach then asked the
plaintiff to apologize to the team for his behavior. When the plaintiff refused, the coach dismissed the
plaintiff from the team. In addition, the football players who had assaulted the plaintiff played in the
next game. The plaintiff contended that both the school’s and its officials’ response to the incident
required him to conform to a macho male stereotype— that he “should have taken it like a man.” Id.
The plaintiff alleged that the coach told him “boys will be boys” and described the incident as merely
peer “hazing.” Further, when the school cancelled the state playoff games in response to the coach’s
conduct, the plaintiff asserted that the response created a “hostile environment” because the plaintiff
“was branded as the football team’s demise.” The principal eventually suggested that the plaintiff
leave school and enroll in a distant county. Id. The plaintiff felt that the school’s response to the
incident was sexually discriminatory and harassing. The plaintiff brought an action under Title IX and
§ 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and
the First Amendment. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and compensatory and punitive
damages. The plaintiff alleged that the high school and school district created and tolerated a hostile
environment violating Title IX. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants, including the school, the
school district, and its employees in their official and individual capacities, violated the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights to equal protection and equal education, procedural due process, substantive due
process, freedom of association, freedom of speech, and familial association under § 1983. Id. at 1230.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss holding that the plaintiff failed to
prove a prima facie case under Title IX and § 1983. 84 F.3d at 1230-31. The plaintiff then appealed the
district court’s judgment regarding his Title IX, substantive and procedural due process, First
Amendment, and injunctive relief claims. Id. at 1232. On appeal, the defendants argued that under Sea
Clammers, Title IX precluded the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Id. at 1233. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that Title IX does not supplant § 1983 constitutional claims. Id. See also Carroll K.
v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (S.D.W. Va. 1998) (holding Title IX
subsumes § 1983 claims “when the underlying set of facts not only violates Title IX but also violates
independent constitutional rights”); Alston, 176 F.R.D. at 223 (W.D. Va. 1997) (same). First, the court
pointed out that Sea Clammers does not apply to constitutionally based § 1983 claims. Seamons, 84
F.3d at 1234. It noted that Sea Clammers “‘speaks only to whether federal statutory rights can be
enforced both through the statute itself and through § 1983;’ it does not ‘stand for the proposition that
a federal statutory scheme can preempt independently existing constitutional rights, which have
contours distinct from the statutory claim.’” Id. at 1233 (quoting Lillard v. Shelby, 76 F.3d 716, 723
(6th Cir. 1996)). The court also stated that in contrast to Sea Clammers “Title IX plaintiffs who bring a
§ 1983 action predicated on constitutional provisions do not circumvent Title IX procedures or gain
access to remedies not available under Title IX.” Id. at 1233 (quoting Lillard, 76 F.3d at 723).
Then, the court relied on the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Lillard v. Shelby,
which used the test in Smith, to hold that Title IX does not preclude constitutionally based § 1983
claims that are not “virtually identical” to each other. Seamons, 84 F.3d at 1233 (“[I]t does not ‘stand
for the proposition that a federal scheme can preempt independently existing constitutional rights,
which have contours distinct from the statutory claims.’”) (quoting Lillard, 76 F.3d at 723). The Tenth
Circuit found, as the Sixth Circuit did in Lillard, that Congress could not have intended to foreclose a
Title IX plaintiff from bringing a constitutionally based § 1983 claim. Id. at 1234. Title IX did not
preclude constitutionally based § 1983 claims because the court found that Title IX’s statutory scheme
was not comprehensive.
The Seamons court did not analyze separately whether each constitutional claim asserted by the
plaintiff was “virtually identical” to the plaintiff’s Title IX claim as required by the Smith test. The
court combined the constitutional claims and summarily decided that they had “contours distinct from
the statutory claim.” Id. It could be argued that the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
claim in Seamons is virtually identical to the plaintiff’s Title IX claim. For other cases that combine
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find that Title IX precludes both constitutionally based and statutorily based
§ 1983 claims.113
the constitutionally based § 1983 claims in this preclusion context, see Williams v. Sch. Dist. of
Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168, 176 (3d Cir. 1993); Nelson v. Univ. of Me., 914 F. Supp. 643, 648 (D.
Me. 1976); Mann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 864 F. Supp. 44, 47-48 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Mabry v. State Bd.
for Cmty. Coll., 597 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 (D.C. Colo. 1984).
The court weighed heavily Title IX’s express statutory enforcement mechanism and its sole
remedial provisions to terminate federal funds, finding its right to a private cause of action only
implied. Seamans, 84 F.3d at 1234. However, unlike the Eighth Circuit in Crawford, the Tenth Circuit
noted that it would bar a § 1983 claim brought on a Title IX claim. Id. at 1234 n.8. The court stated
that allowing both claims creates a “duplicative effort.” Id. See also Does v. Covington County Sch.
Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp. 554, 573-74, 574 n.15 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (dismissing a § 1983 claim based
upon Title IX against the Board of Education as duplicitous and unnecessary because no additional
remedies, legal or equitable, are available to the plaintiffs under § 1983, and allowing a Title IX
plaintiff to pursue constitutionally based § 1983 claims). Furthermore, the court in Covington found
that a plaintiff may not bring a § 1983 claim based upon Title IX against individual defendants because
such action would effectively allow plaintiffs to gain remedies unavailable under Title IX and
circumvent congressional intent to foreclose such Title IX actions. Id. at 574.
113. See Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990); Waid v.Merrill, 91
F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996). In Pfeiffer a school dismissed Arlene Pfeiffer from her high school’s chapter
of the National Honors Society because of her premarital sexual activity and pregnancy. 917 F.2d at
780-82. The National Honor Society selects its members based on scholarship, service, leadership, and
character. The National Honor Society’s handbook describes one of the qualities of leadership as
whether a student exerts the type of leadership which directly influences others for good conduct.
Under the heading “Character,” the handbook places importance on whether a student upholds
principles of morality and ethics. The faculty council believed that Pfeiffer’s premarital sex was
contrary to the qualities of leadership and character required for National Honor Society membership.
Pfeiffer appealed the faculty’s decision to the school board, which unanimously affirmed the faculty
council’s decision. Id.
Pfeiffer brought suit for injunctive relief and damages under Title IX alleging gender
discrimination and under § 1983 based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
783. She sued the school district, the school board, and faculty council members in their official and
individual capacities, and the superintendent in his official and individual capacities. Id.
The district court held that Pfeiffer’s Title IX claim subsumed her constitutional claims. Id. at 783.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed. The Third Circuit reasoned that under
Sea Clammers, a sufficiently comprehensive statute like Title IX does not allow “the requirements of
that enforcement procedure [to be] bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983” on the same set of
facts leading to the federal violation. Id. (citing Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20 (1981), and quoting
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 673 n.2 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)). For
a discussion of cases finding Title IX sufficiently comprehensive, see Williams, 998 F.2d at 176
(holding constitutional claims under § 1983 for the same instance of intentional discrimination are
precluded because Title IX’s comprehensive scheme fully addresses such matters); Kemether, 15 F.
Supp. 2d at 756 (holding that § 1983 claims are subsumed by Title IX under See Clammers); Nelson,
914 F. Supp. at 648 (holding that Title IX’s enforcement scheme is comprehensive); Mennone, 889 F.
Supp. at 59 (“Since there is no Second Circuit authority on the issue, we will apply Sea Clammers’ test
. . . [and] conclude that Title IX has a sufficiently comprehensive enforcement scheme to foreclose
enforcement through § 1983.”); Bougher, 713 F. Supp. at 145 (same); Mabry, 597 F. Supp. at 1239
(same); cf. Seneway, 969 F. Supp. at 331 (holding “Title IX establishes a comprehensive enforcement
scheme and . . . § 1983 claims are subsumed within Title IX claims” but still allowing them to proceed
against individuals in their personal capacities); Mann, 864 F. Supp. at 47-48 (dismissing § 1983
claims based on violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to equal protection against the
University and teachers in their official capacities because Title IX provides its own comprehensive
enforcement scheme, but allowing plaintiff’s § 1983 claims to proceed against teachers in their
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personal capacities).
For cases relying on claims based on a single set of facts for preclusion, see Waid, 91 F.3d at 862
(“[A] plaintiff may not claim that a single set of facts leads to causes of action under both Title IX and
§ 1983.”); Kemether, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 756 (“A single set of facts cannot lead to causes of action under
both Title IX and § 1983 . . . .”); Nelson, 914 F. Supp. at 648 (holding that Title IX subsumes
plaintiff’s § 1983 and First Amendment claims because they arise from the same underlying facts);
Mennone, 889 F. Supp. at 59 (“The Third Circuit has held that constitutional claims grounded on the
same underlying facts as a Title IX claim are ‘subsumed’. . . .”).
Without further explanation, the Third Circuit then cited to several other cases where courts
similarly apply Sea Clammers to preclude § 1983 claims when a comprehensive federal statute exists.
Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 789. For support, the Third Circuit cited Smith v. Robinson, among other cases,
and noted that the Supreme Court held that the “Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400, et seq., with its comprehensive enforcement scheme, precluded the plaintiffs’ claim of
handicap discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause.” Id. (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468
U.S. 992 (1984)).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion and provided a more
thorough analysis in Waid v. Merrill. 91 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1996). In the fall of 1990, the Merrill Area
Public Schools (MAPS) hired Tina Waid as a substitute teacher for its Junior High School. Shortly
thereafter, a member of the faculty died, and Waid took over that teacher’s duties for the remainder of
the school year. The next summer MAPS looked for a replacement and hired Richard Bonnell for the
position, despite the fact that Waid had previously been selected over Bonnell for the substitute
teaching position. Id. at 859-60.
Ms. Waid sued under Title IX, alleging that MAPS intentionally discriminated against her on the
basis of her sex. Id. at 860. She also sued under § 1983, alleging that the principal of the school and the
director of the school’s curriculum in their individual capacities violated her right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 860. The defendants argued that Sea Clammers barred Ms.
Waid’s § 1983 claims. Id. at 860. The district court agreed and entered summary judgment for the
defendants. Id.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that Title IX precluded Ms. Waid’s constitutionally based
§ 1983 claim. Id. at 863. Cf. Lakoski, 66 F.3d at 758 (holding that Title VII provides the exclusive
remedy for individuals alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded
institutions and prohibits filing an employment discrimination charge for monetary damages under
Title IX directly or derivatively through § 1983). The court reasoned that Title IX and an equal
protection claim were essentially identical. “Both statutes prohibit the same kind of conduct and
provide compensatory and punitive damages as remedies for that conduct. . . . Therefore, a plaintiff
may not claim that a single set of facts leads to causes of action under both Title IX and Section 1983.”
Waid, 91 F.3d at 862. For other cases adhering to the same reasoning, see infra note 143 and
accompanying text.
Additionally, the court found that Title IX’s statutory scheme provided for the termination of
federal funds and an implied right to equitable and monetary damages. 91 F.3d at 862. “[T]itle IX
gives plaintiffs access to the full panoply of judicial remedies.” Id. at 862-63. See also Bruneau, 935 F.
Supp. at 178-79 (holding that Congress’s implicit acceptance of Cannon’s finding of an implied
private right of action under Title IX, combined with the judicial rule that a plaintiff may receive all
judicially cognizable remedies under recognized rights of action, is significant evidence of
congressional intent to supplant § 1983); Mennone, 889 F. Supp. at 59-60 (detailing Title IX’s
administrative enforcement scheme which requires voluntary compliance or denial of federal funding,
noting a private plaintiff’s ability to seek equitable and compensatory relief and reasonable attorney’s
fees for intentional violations of the statute, and holding Title IX has “a sufficiently comprehensive
enforcement scheme to demonstrate that Congress intended to foreclose enforcement through
§ 1983”).
Finding that Title IX provided substantial remedies, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that Congress
created a “strong incentive for schools to adopt policies” safeguarding the civil rights of its students
and employees and implicitly expressed that Title IX should be exclusive. “Congress saw Title IX as
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B. Hard Cases Can Make Bad Law
Because the facts in each case of sex discrimination under Title IX are
unique, the substantive claims asserted under Title IX and § 1983 vary in
each case.114 This lack of consistency makes comparison among cases
difficult. In addition, courts are continually reinterpreting the impact of
developing civil rights legislation and case law.115 However, several obvious
and recurring problems arise in the courts’ analyses of whether Title IX
precludes § 1983 claims.
These problems separate into four categories. First, some courts
mistakenly apply Sea Clammers, instead of Smith, to determine whether Title
IX precludes constitutionally based § 1983 claims.116 Second, courts are split
on which criteria to rely upon in determining whether Title IX provides the
“exclusive avenue” to redress sex discrimination in educational settings
under the Smith test or whether Congress foreclosed private enforcement of
the federal statute in the enactment itself under Sea Clammers. Within this
split, a majority of the courts apply an “express language approach,” and a
minority of the courts apply a “contextual approach.”117 Third, courts fail to
apply correctly the “virtually identical” prong of the Smith test.118 Fourth, a
majority of the courts ignore the significance of plaintiffs suing individuals in
the context of Title IX.119
1. Inappropriate Expansion of Sea Clammer’s Application
The first common problem courts create in determining Title IX’s
preclusion of § 1983 claims is to apply mistakenly the Sea Clammers
doctrine to assess whether Title IX precludes a constitutionally based § 1983
the device for redressing any grievance arising from a violation of federal civil rights by an
educational institution.” Waid, 91 F.3d at 862-63. See also Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 178 (reasoning “a
private right of action is significant evidence of congressional intent to supplant a [§ 1983] remedy”)
(citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 427 (1987)).
Moreover, the burden of complying with federal civil rights law was better placed on the
educational institution rather than the individuals associated with that institution. Waid, 91 F.3d at 862.
For these reasons, the court concluded that with Title IX, Congress “effectively superseded” a cause of
action under § 1983 based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
863.
114. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
115. See generally supra notes 23-26, 46-65 and accompanying text.
116. See infra Part V.B.1.
117. See infra Part V.B.2.
118. See infra Part V.B.3.
119. See infra Part V.B.4.
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claim.120 This is incorrect because the Sea Clammers doctrine applies only
when a federal statute precludes a plaintiff from asserting a § 1983 claim
based upon that same federal statute.121 Applying Sea Clammers to
determine whether a statute precludes a constitutionally based claim is
inapposite.122
2. Is Title IX the “Exclusive Avenue”?
The second problem is the inconsistent interpretation of the Supreme
Court’s two tests (Smith and Sea Clammers) to determine whether Title IX
precludes § 1983 claims. The courts are split on what criteria to use when
examining whether Title IX provides the “exclusive avenue” through which
Congress intended to redress sex discrimination in schools under the Smith
test123 or whether Congress “foreclosed private enforcement of the federal
statute within the enactment itself under Sea Clammers.”124 The majority of
courts look at only the express language. This express language approach
concludes that courts should consider the express language within the statute
in isolation to determine under Sea Clammers whether Congress intended to
foreclose all remedies other than those in Title IX.125 Courts following the
express language approach interpret Title IX to provide for either voluntary
compliance or termination of federal funding. This express-language
interpretation does not provide “unusually elaborate enforcement” measures,
such as private citizen suits, like the statute at issue in Sea Clammers.126
Thus, express-language courts conclude that Congress did not intend for Title
IX to be the exclusive avenue for a plaintiff to vindicate identical
constitutional violations.127 Additionally, under the express-language
approach, the implied private right of action found under Cannon is not part
of Congress’s express Title IX remedies.128 The Supreme Court’s holdings in
Cannon and Franklin, expanding Title IX’s remedial scheme, only signals to
these express-language courts that Title IX’s remedial scheme was not
120. See Waid, 91 F.3d at 862; Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 789; Williams, 998 F.2d at 176; Kemether, 15
F. Supp. 2d at 756; Seneway, 969 F. Supp. at 330-31; Mennone, 889 F. Supp. at 59; Oona, 890 F.
Supp. at 1459-62; Mann, 864 F. Supp. at 47-48; Mabry, 597 F. Supp. at 1239.
121. For a discussion of Sea Clammers, see  supra Part IV.A.
122. See supra note 83.
123. See supra notes 87, 104 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 85, 88-89 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text; see also Zwibelman, supra note 83, at 1475-
76.
126. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
127. See id.
128. See id..
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intended to be exclusive or to foreclose private enforcement in the enactment
itself as required under Smith and Sea Clammers.129
These express-language cases rely heavily on the literal meaning of Title
IX’s language, just as the Supreme Court limited itself to the express
language of the federal statute at issue in Sea Clammers to establish the Sea
Clammers test for preclusion.130 In contrast, the Court in Smith did limit itself
to the Education of the Handicapped Act’s express language.131 Nevertheless,
express-language courts that find Title IX not comprehensive under the Sea
Clammers doctrine also consistently limit their analysis of Title IX under the
Smith test to the express language of Title IX.132
A minority of courts apply a contextual approach that considers the
implied right of action found under Cannon to be implicitly expressed within
Title IX.133 Contextual courts find that Title IX’s implied right of action and
explicit remedies involving termination of federal funding and voluntary
compliance create a sufficiently comprehensive remedial scheme to foreclose
private enforcement under Sea Clammers134 and serve as the exclusive
avenue to assert “virtually identical” constitutionally based claims.135
Despite the difference in the express language and contextual courts’
approaches to interpreting the remedial scope of Title IX, both approaches
use the same analysis of Title IX to determine whether the statute precludes
§ 1983 claims under the Smith test or under the Sea Clammers doctrine.
Using the same analysis for both tests is inappropriate.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Smith— that Congress intended the
EHA to be the exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may assert a
virtually identical constitutional claim— differed from its reasoning in Sea
Clammers— that Congress intended to foreclose § 1983 claims based on the
federal statute.136 In Sea Clammers, the Court did not want to allow a
plaintiff to gain remedies not available under an already comprehensive
statute by asserting violations of that same statute under § 1983.137 Under this
reasoning, the “comprehensiveness” of the federal statute was a key
129. See id.
130. See Zwibelman, supra note 83, at 1476.
131. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
132. Cf. supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
133. See generally supra note 113 and accompanying text.
134. See id.; see, e.g., Breneau v. Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 178-79 (N.D.N.Y.
1996).
135. None of the courts that have precluded constitutionally based § 1983 claims in the context of
a Title IX violation appear to have properly applied the “virtually identical” prong of the Smith test.
See infra Part V.B.3.
136. Cf. supra notes 92-97, 105-10 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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determinant in the preclusion analysis. Under the Smith test, Title IX’s
comprehensiveness may have played a role in the Court’s analysis, but the
Court’s main concern was whether the virtually identical constitutional
claims would bypass important legislative policies captured in the federal
statute.138
3. Which Claims Are Virtually Identical?
Third, courts fail to apply properly the “virtually identical” prong of the
Smith test in two ways. In some cases, courts combine all the alleged
constitutional violations without analyzing each claim seperately under the
Smith test.139 For example, in Seamons140 the court held that under the Smith
test Title IX did not preclude constitutionally based § 1983 claims.141
Without analyzing the plaintiff’s First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process claims separately, the court
incorrectly combined all the plaintiff’s constitutional claims together and
held that none were virtually identical.142 Rather than following the Seamons
court’s method for applying the Smith test, courts should apply the “virtually
identical” test by separately comparing the plaintiff’s Title IX claim to each
asserted constitutionally based § 1983 claim.
In other cases, courts interpret the “virtually identical” language used in
Smith to mean that any constitutional claim grounded in the same underlying
set of facts leading to the Title IX violation is virtually identical to the right
granted by Title IX.143 This interpretation leads to illogical results. One event
of sexual harassment against a student in a school setting may lead to more
than one cause of action. By inappropriately touching a student, a school
official may violate both a student’s right to be free from sex discrimination
and right to bodily integrity.144 If a school official discourages a student from
reporting a discriminatory occurrence, he or she may simultaneously violate
a student’s rights to free speech, to be free from sex discrimination, and to
receive a fair and impartial hearing.145
Although the same set of underlying facts is an important factor in
138. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
140. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of Seamons, see supra
note 112.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., supra note 111 and accompanying text.
145. See id.
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assessing whether a constitutional claim is virtually identical to a Title IX
claim, courts must recognize that it is not the only determinant. To apply the
“virtually identical” prong of the Smith test, courts should compare whether
the substantive rights, parties alleged, and set of facts leading to each and
every constitutional violation asserted, is virtually identical to the substantive
rights, parties alleged, and set of facts leading to the federal statutory
violation.146
4. Victims Want Individuals to Be Held Responsible— Should They Be?
Many courts fail to place importance on whether a plaintiff bringing a suit
under § 1983 is suing state actors in their official or individual capacities and
what impact, if any, that difference may have on an analysis under Sea
Clammers or Smith.147 Courts concluding that Title IX does not foreclose a
remedy under § 1983 based on Title IX itself must recognize that plaintiffs
suing individuals for a Title IX violation, albeit under § 1983, will be
enlarging Title IX’s mandate beyond Congress’s intent.148 Because most
courts find that Title IX does not create liability on the part of individual
defendants, allowing a remedy for a violation of Title IX under § 1983
against individuals will enlarge Title IX’s remedial scheme.149 This result
turns Sea Clammers on its face, allowing a plaintiff to gain access to
remedies unavailable directly under Title IX and to circumvent congressional
intent to foreclose such actions.150 Moreover, courts that hold equal
protection claims against individuals are virtually identical to Title IX claims
ignore the current consensus that individuals cannot be sued under Title
IX.151 If individuals cannot be sued under Title IX, an equal protection claim
asserted against individuals cannot be virtually identical to a Title IX claim.
These considerations should play a part in resolving whether Title IX
precludes statutorily or constitutionally based § 1983 claims and will be
discussed further in my proposal to this preclusion problem.
146. See infra Part VI.B.
147. See infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Covington, 930 F. Supp. at 573-74.
149. See supra notes 20, 26-30 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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VI. RESOLVED: A CONSISTENT AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO
TITLE IX PRECLUSION LAW
This proposal first argues that Title IX precludes § 1983 claims based on
Title IX under the Sea Clammers test. Secondly, the proposal proffers that
under the Smith test, the only constitutional claim that is virtually identical to
a Title IX claim is an equal protection violation by a governing entity and its
officials. Even so, this section will explain why Title IX does not preclude
any constitutionally based § 1983 claim under the Smith test.
A. Title IX and Its Derivatives Asserted Under § 1983
When courts are faced with whether a federal statute preempts a § 1983
claim based on that statute, courts must apply the Sea Clammers test to
determine whether in that case the statute: (1) creates an enforceable right
within the meaning of “rights, privileges, and immunities” and (2) is
sufficiently comprehensive to foreclose private enforcement in the enactment
itself.152 It is undisputed that Title IX creates a “right” as recognized under
§ 1983. Therefore, the first prong of the Sea Clammers test does not preclude
§ 1983 claims.153 The more contentious issue is whether Congress intended
to foreclose private enforcement in the enactment itself.
The express language courts rely on the “enactment itself” under the Sea
Clammers test. The courts’ interpretation of Title IX’s remedial scheme,
then, is limited to that which is explicitly expressed in the original enactment
and regulations (for example, federal funding termination or voluntary
compliance).154 However, in applying the contextual approach, courts find
that the Civil Rights Amendments of 1991, the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 1986, and the implied right of action are part of Title IX’s
mandate because they are expressed in the “enactment itself.”155 The best
way to effectuate Congress’s intent for Title IX enforcement is through the
contextual approach. Although this is currently the minority approach,
adoption of this approach will preserve the integrity of Title IX and motivate
schools to take responsibility for and prevent discrimination within their
classrooms.
Express language courts findng Title IX’s provisions insufficient to
152. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 51 (finding an implied right of action under Title IX).
154. See supra Part V.B.2; see also Zwibelman, supra note 83, at 1476 (arguing that courts must
adhere to the “enactment itself” language used in Sea Clammers and, therefore, find that Title IX is not
comprehensive because it only provides for federal funding termination).
155. See supra Part V.B.2.
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preclude § 1983 claims based upon Title IX itself face the predicament of
allowing plaintiffs to sue individuals under § 1983 for violating Title IX,
even though most courts agree individuals should not be liable under Title
IX. Most courts agree that to enforce Title IX Congress intended to place
responsibility on educational institutions receiving federal funds and their
actors in their official capacities.156 As discussed above in Part V.B.4,
permitting § 1983 claims based on Title IX to proceed against individuals
circumvents Congress’s intent when it enacted Title IX.157 Ironically, Sea
Clammers expressly prohibits this type of back door litigation.158 To avoid
frustrating congressional intent, an express-language court could permit
§ 1983 claims based on Title IX, but not those directed against individuals in
their individual capacity. However, this conclusion limits § 1983 claims in a
manner unrecognized by the statute’s language or in its judicial history.159
The contextual approach, unlike the express-language approach, finds Title
IX sufficiently comprehensive to foreclose private enforcement in the
enactment itself and avoids frustrating congressional intent in enacting Title
IX or § 1983.
Lastly, having concluded that Title IX precludes § 1983 claims based
upon violations of Title IX, it is important to note that this conclusion
comports with similar findings of other courts in the context of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,160 which provides similar administrative and
156. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
157. See id.
158. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1004 (“Sea Clammers had to do only with an effort to enlarge a
statutory remedy by asserting a claim based on that statute under the ‘and laws’ provision of § 1983.”).
159. See Covington, 930 F. Supp. at 573-74. Some other courts have held that Title IX was
sufficiently comprehensive and precluded § 1983 claims based on Title IX and Fourteenth Amendment
violations against governing entities and officials in their official capacities, but, nevertheless, allowed
§ 1983 claims to proceed against individuals in their individual capacities. See Seneway, 969 F. Supp.
at 330; Mann, 864 F. Supp. at 47-48.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). See Cheryl L. Anderson, “Nothing Personal”: Individual
Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Sexual Harassment as an Equal Protection Claim, 19 BERKELEY
J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 60, 64 & n.19, 69 & nn.48-49 (1998). Anderson argues, however, the
following:
[T]he language of § 1983 on its face suggests that the defendant’s acts in violating Title VII
should support a claim under § 1983. The statute allows suit against a “person” who violates not
only the Constitution, but also the “laws” of the United States. In recognizing individual liability
in the first place, the Supreme Court has indicated that such liability is analytically separate from
the “official” actions of the government entity or the individual state actor.
Id. at 71.
On a general level, Anderson’s argument is persuasive. However, it ignores the fact that when
Congress creates a right, the legislative body may purposefully design a statute to allocate the burden
of liability on some actors but not others. Congress may create an avenue of redress in a way that it
believes will best serve the interests of the victim and eradicate the problem. Holding individuals liable
for federal statutory violations may not have been Congress’s intent.
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judicial remedies.161 In designing Title VII, Congress did not intend to create
a federal cause of action against individuals.162 Instead, Congress intended to
force employers to create workplaces that comply with a national policy of
equal employment opportunity.163
Similarly, Congress did not intend for Title IX to create a federal cause of
action against individual discriminators, but against educational institutions
and their officials who discriminate on the basis of sex.164 Congress intended
to bring school systems in compliance with a national policy of equal
educational opportunity.165 As the Court states in Cannon, Title IX’s goals
are to end sex discrimination in educational institutions, to “provide
individual citizens with effective protection,” and to further ensure “orderly
enforcement of the statute.”166
B. Which Claims Are Not “Virtually Identical”?
To determine whether Title IX precludes a constitutionally based § 1983
claim, courts must apply the Smith test to examine whether: (1) the
constitutional violation is virtually identical to the asserted statutory right,
and (2) Congress intended the statute to be the exclusive avenue for
redress.167 Under the first prong of the Smith test, if a constitutional claim
asserted under § 1983 is not virtually identical to the federal statutory claim,
then courts may not preclude the constitutional claim.168 The Smith Court did
not define the meaning of “virtually identical,” nor has the Court applied the
Smith test to a constitutionally based § 1983 claim since.169 Thus, according
to traditional rules of statutory construction, the plain meaning of “virtually
identical” should prevail.170 The plain meaning of “virtually identical”
translates to something that is “in essence or effect but not in fact” the
same.171 Under this interpretation, no constitutional claim asserted under
§ 1983, except for an equal protection violation against governing entities or
state officials, is virtually identical to a Title IX claim.
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994) (describing Title VII’s administrative and judicial enforcement
provisions).
162. See Anderson, supra note 160.
163. See id.
164. See supra notes 20, 26-30 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 99, 104 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 104 and accompanying text.
169. See Zwibelman, supra note 83, at 1479.
170. See id.
171. WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 413, 994 (7th ed. 1973).
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Clearly, substantive due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment
are not virtually identical to a Title IX violation. Although Title IX involves
the right to be free from sex discrimination in federally funded institutions,
substantive due process grants a person the right to bodily integrity against
any person acting under color of law.172 Furthermore, procedural due process
rights are not virtually identical to Title IX violations either.173
Finally, an equal protection claim174 against individuals175 also differs
from a claim under Title IX.176 The law of claim preclusion supports this
reasoning: to preclude a claim in a trial, the plaintiff must prove that the
plaintiff previously asserted and fully litigated the same claim in another trial.
Each claim must address the same substantive rights, be asserted against the
same party, and arise out of the same underlying set of facts.177 In an equal
protection claim against an individual, a Title IX violation may address the
same substantive right and arise out of the same set of underlying facts.
However, the plaintiff does not assert, nor could the plaintiff assert, the claim
against the same party.178 Therefore, claims under § 1983 for a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause against individuals are
not virtually identical to Title IX claims and therefore can be maintained in
the same lawsuit under the Smith test.
C. “Virtually Identical” Claims Cannot Coexist
The only constitutional privilege virtually identical to any right granted
under Title IX is a claim asserting a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause against federally funded governing
entities and their officials. Both Title IX and such Equal Protection claims
address the same substantive rights.179 If asserted against the same parties
and arising out of the same facts, the constitutional privilege and the federal
statute meet the “virtually identical” prong of the Smith preclusion test.
172. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. See also Zwibelman, supra note 83, at 1480.
173. See supra note 74.
174. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
176. Most courts hold that Title IX does not create a right to sue individuals. See supra note 20
and accompanying text.
177. See generally 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction
and Related Matters §§ 4406-15. (1981).
178. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. Furthermore, one commentator notes that, in
the Title VII context, “the growing consensus is that there is no remedy against the individual
defendant under Title VII or related statutes. Under these circumstances, the § 1983 claim can be
perceived as ‘independent.’ It is not only independent, it is the only claim available.” Anderson, supra
note 160, at 70.
179. See supra notes 26-30, 77 and accompanying text.
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Courts must then determine whether Congress intended Title IX to be the
exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may find redress for that violation
under the second prong of the Smith test.180
For three persuasive reasons, the administrative remedies under Title IX
are not critical in Congress’s effort to aid educational institutions in
complying with their obligation to “provide citizens effective protection
against discriminatory practices.” Therefore, Title IX does not provide the
exclusive avenue through which a plaintiff may bring a claim involving a
Title IX violation. First, Title IX does not require a plaintiff to exhaust any
administrative remedies before bringing an action in federal court.181 Second,
a complainant need not attempt to find redress through an educational
institution’s internal grievance procedure before filing a complaint with the
DOE.182 Third, under the administrative enforcement scheme, a plaintiff
receives no personal compensation.183
Allowing a plaintiff to assert both an Equal Protection claim under § 1983
and a Title IX violation in federal court may be duplicitous, but would not
curtail the detailed procedural protections in Title IX. Thus, avoiding Title
IX’s administrative procedures does not circumvent Congress’s effort to
allocate responsibility to the schools to eliminate sex discrimination in
education and provide effective protection for citizens.184 Furthermore, this
reasoning comports with other courts’ examinations of Title VII and virtually
identical § 1983 claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.185 Therefore, equal protection claims brought under
§ 1983 against federally funded government entities and their officials that
are virtually identical to Title IX remedial actions can be maintained in the
same lawsuit, but may likely be dismissed as duplicitous.
VI. CONCLUSION
In concluding that Title IX precludes § 1983 claims based upon Title IX
itself because the statute is sufficiently comprehensive, courts can recognize
180. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 46.
182. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 23-25.
185. See Anderson, supra note 160, at 69 & n.50. However, Equal Protection claims asserted
against governing entities and their actors along with Title IX claims will often be dismissed as
duplicitous and unnecessary. See Mann, 864 F. Supp. at 47 (“The Supreme Court has made clear that
when a federal statute provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, courts should follow it
and exercise substantial restraint before unnecessarily reaching constitutional claims.”) (citing
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981)).
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the full breadth of Title IX and its potential to redress sex discrimination in
educational settings. The contextual approach preserves the integrity of Title
IX. Section 1983 claims based on Title IX only frustrate congressional intent
to place liability on schools rather than individuals. On the other hand,
allowing independently existing constitutional rights to proceed under § 1983
in the context of a Title IX case in no way frustrates the integrity of Title IX,
and it also preserves an avenue for victims in educational settings to seek
vindication from offenders in their individual capacities. This proposal takes
into account both sides of the argument for and against precluding § 1983
claims and finds a middle of the road approach that comports with
Congress’s intent to “provide individual citizens with effective protection”
and further ensure “orderly enforcement of the statute.”186
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